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- NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
- being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
- The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
- prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
- See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
-
- SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
-
- Syllabus
-
- ANKENBRANDT, AS NEXT FRIEND AND MOTHER
- OF L. R., et al. v. RICHARDS et al.
- certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
- the fifth circuit
- No. 91-367. Argued March 31, 1992-Decided June 15, 1992
-
- Petitioner brought this suit on behalf of her daughters in the District
- Court, alleging federal jurisdiction based on the diversity-of-citizen-
- ship provision of 28 U.S.C. 1332, and seeking monetary damages
- for alleged torts committed against the girls by their father and his
- female companion, the respondents here. The court granted respon-
- dents' motion to dismiss without prejudice, ruling in the alternative
- that it lacked jurisdiction because the case fell within the ``domestic
- relations'' exception to diversity jurisdiction and that its decision to
- dismiss was justified under the abstention principles announced in
- Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
- Held:
- 1.A domestic relations exception to federal diversity jurisdiction
- exists as a matter of statutory construction. Pp.3-11.
- (a)The exception stems from Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582,
- 584, in which the Court announced in dicta, without citation of
- authority or discussion of foundation, that federal courts have no
- jurisdiction over suits for divorce or the allowance of alimony. The
- lower federal courts have ever since recognized a limitation on their
- jurisdiction based on that statement, and this Court is unwilling to
- cast aside an understood rule that has existed for nearly a century
- and a half. Pp.3-5.
- (b)An examination of Article III, 2, of the Constitution and of
- Barber and its progeny makes clear that the Constitution does not
- mandate the exclusion of domestic relations cases from federal-court
- jurisdiction. Rather, the origins of the exception lie in the statutory
- requirements for diversity jurisdiction. De La Rama v. De La Rama,
- 201 U.S. 303, 307. Pp.5-7.
- (c)That the domestic relations exception exists is demonstrated
- by the inclusion of the defining phrase, ``all suits of a civil nature at
- common law or in equity,'' in the pre-1948 versions of the diversity
- statute, by Barber's implicit interpretation of that phrase to exclude
- divorce and alimony actions, and by Congress' silent acceptance of
- this construction for nearly a century. Considerations of stare decisis
- have particular strength in this context, where the legislative power
- is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what this Court has
- done. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-173.
- Furthermore, it may be presumed that Congress amended the
- diversity statute in 1948 to replace the law/equity distinction with
- 1332's ``all civil actions'' phrase with full cognizance of the Court's
- longstanding interpretation of the prior statutes, and that, absent any
- indication of an intent to the contrary, Congress adopted that inter-
- pretation in reenacting the statute. Pp.7-11.
- 2.The domestic relations exception does not permit a district court
- to refuse to exercise diversity jurisdiction over a tort action for
- damages. The exception, as articulated by this Court since Barber,
- encompasses only cases involving the issuance of a divorce, alimony,
- or child custody decree. As so limited, the exception's validity must
- be reaffirmed, given the long passage of time without any expression
- of congressional dissatisfaction and sound policy considerations of
- judicial economy and expertise. Because this lawsuit in no way seeks
- a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree, the Court of Appeals
- erred by affirming the District Court's invocation of the domestic
- relations exception. Federal subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to
- 1332 is proper in this case. Pp.11-15.
- 3.The District Court erred in abstaining from exercising jurisdic-
- tion under the Younger doctrine. Although this Court has extended
- Younger abstention to the civil context, it has never applied the
- notions of comity so critical to Younger where, as here, no proceeding
- was pending in state tribunals. Similarly, while it is not inconceiv-
- able that in certain circumstances the abstention principles developed
- in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, might be relevant in a case
- involving elements of the domestic relationship even when the parties
- do not seek divorce, alimony, or child custody, such abstention is
- inappropriate here, where the status of the domestic relationship has
- been determined as a matter of state law, and in any event has no
- bearing on the underlying torts alleged. Pp.15-16.
- 934 F.2d 1262, reversed and remanded.
-
- White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
- C. J., and O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined.
- Blackmun, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Stevens,
- J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas, J.,
- joined.
-